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Understanding and (dis)trusting food assurance schemes: consumer 
confidence and the ‘knowledge fix’.  
 
Introduction 
 
Campaigners are increasingly concerned about food consumption and production 
practices in industrialised countries, because such practices can cause environmental 
damage, poverty and social inequity for people across the world.  Their solution has 
been to promote quality, authenticity, localness, sustainability, fairtrade,1 animal welfare 
and other attributes of food production and sale, in order to change these practices.  This 
has provided much material for academic researchers, who can be both sympathetic to 
and critical of such solutions.  In particular, food assurance schemes have been 
developed to reconnect consumers with production by, first, raising consumer 
awareness about the consequences of the products that they buy and, second, harnessing 
consumer purchasing power to push production towards ‘better’ and more sustainable 
practices.  Examples include assurance about organic methods of production, animal 
welfare standards and prices paid to producers through fairtrade schemes.  The 
consumer is thus conceived as part of the problem but also potentially part of the 
solution.   
 
However, much of this campaigning and academic literature has focused upon how food 
is produced, distributed and sold and very little upon how it is perceived, viewed and 
consumed.  The presumptions about localness, authenticity and quality have therefore 
been little verified.  This paper takes a more consumer-oriented approach to the question 
of food quality and, using evidence from focus groups with consumers in England, 
considers how consumers understand and evaluate a range of proxies that offer 
assurance about food and consumer products, particularly voluntary certification 
schemes.  Our focus is therefore how people understand food production and assurance 
information, rather than how food production itself is organised and marketed.  In this 
way, we aim to fill the gap currently growing between the production-oriented 
arguments from the agro-food literature and the consumers on whom many of their 
arguments depend, in seeking to harness consumer power to change food production 
systems.   
 
Fixing the problem of consumer knowledge about food production 
 
We begin by outlining the agro-food and consumption literature mentioned above.  This 
has both environmental and sociopolitical interests in changing how food is produced 
and traded across the world, in favour of better diets, less environmental damage and 
support for small-scale farming.  A key argument here is that consumers in developed 
economies are increasingly disconnected or distanced from producers in both developed 
and developing economies (e.g. Princen, 1997), and that this has allowed producers and 
retailers (by which writers usually mean big corporations) to sell food which is 
increasingly damaging for human health, the environment and development, especially 
in the global South.  A solution commonly proposed is to reverse this distancing, to 
reconnect consumers with producers through education and information provision about 
systems of food production, so that consumers will avoid food coming from such 
damaging systems and instead favour food from more beneficial systems (for examples, 
see Jackson et al. 2006).   
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Such arguments tend to emphasise (1) shorter supply chains that bring consumers face-
to-face with producers through farmers’ markets, farmgate sales and organic box 
schemes (e.g. Ilbery et al., 2005; Holloway and Kneafsey, 2000; Hinrichs, 2000; 
Seyfang, 2006) and (2) assurance schemes that reconnect producers to consumers 
through information on packaging even where producers and consumers do not come 
into direct contact (e.g. Morris and Young, 2004).2  Both seek to build consumer trust 
and confidence in food and thus to change consumer behaviour in favour of smaller 
scale, less damaging production systems, and also to foster a wider ‘ethics of care’ 
(Barnett et al., 2005; Holloway and Kneafsey, 2000; Cook et al., 1998).  Campaigning 
groups share this academic agenda and have used reconnection arguments to market 
produce, for example, through the Countryside Commission’s ‘Eat the View’ and 
Sustain’s ‘Sustainable Food Chains’ (analysed by Jackson et al., 2006).  The Curry 
Report (Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food, 2002) to the UK 
government likewise claimed to take reconnection as its central theme, although (like 
the academic literature) it primarily looked at the problem from the point of view of 
producers rather than consumers.  Retailers and manufacturers in the UK have put 
photographs and biographical details of ‘real’ farmers on packaging to sell produce 
through both national and regional connections, e.g. Marks and Spencer’s ‘named 
farmer’ scheme or the Yorkshire Soup Company’s ‘local heroes’.  This agenda also 
links to arguments about ‘slow food’ (Honoré 2004) in Europe and the benefits of 
retaining traditional knowledge about foods and cooking practices.   
 
The problem is that changing consumer behaviour in this way relies on knowledge: that 
more information will re-connect consumers and producers.  This is often linked with 
political economy and the intent to ‘unveil’ and defetishise the commodities produced 
by modern capitalism (Hudson and Hudson 2003), although debate is rife about whether 
this can and should be done (e.g. Jackson 2002; Goss 2004).  Our purpose in this paper 
is to contribute to this debate by evaluating food assurance schemes that seek to provide 
this knowledge fix and to show the difficulties of implementing this worthy but 
somewhat simplistic principle.  Our interest is not in knowledges provided by 
consumers’ own senses or experiences, which have been studied elsewhere, but in what 
we term ‘knowledge intermediaries’ that provide information to assure consumers and 
to change their purchasing behaviour.  Many of these subscribe to the agenda outlined 
above and have developed schemes to reconnect consumers and producers through 
certifying the conditions of production and their consequences for the environment, 
human health and animal welfare.  They do this not through face-to-face contact but 
through on- and off-product identification (and thus differentiation) using qualities 
which consumers themselves cannot detect.  These have been termed ‘credence’, 
‘proxy’ or ‘secondary’ qualities in the consumer literature (e.g. Frewer et al., 2003; 
Grunert, 2002) as they rely not on direct consumer perception but on belief and 
confidence in these knowledge intermediaries.  For example, the UK’s National 
Consumer Council (2003, p. 10) reported that consumers in its survey believed ‘that to 
have clear, honest, transparent food labelling was the foundation for consumer choice.’  
Such schemes are thus a good contrast to the emphasis in the literature on face-to-face 
solutions to the reconnection issue, especially farmgate sales, farmers’ markets and 
delivery schemes (e.g. Ilbery et al., 2005; D Watts et al., 2005; Policy Commission on 
the Future of Farming and Food, 2002; Seyfang, 2006; for a critique, see Hinrichs, 
2000).  
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Assurance schemes are varied: they range from information that can be objectively 
verifiable by a third party, such as salt content of food or toughness of a car windscreen, 
to judgements that cannot, such as rating a favourite restaurant.  They use a variety of 
intermediaries, from famous names to charities, to assure consumers that the 
information they provide is valid and actionable.  The geographical literature has 
(understandably) focused upon geographical assurances about the region of origin and, 
hence, authenticity of the product (e.g. Ilbery and Kneafsey, 2000; Parrott et al., 2002), 
despite Tregear et al. (1998, p. 392) finding that consumer awareness of such schemes 
was low and that these designations were ‘unlikely to have any influence on consumer 
perceptions or purchases of regional foods’. However, producing and consuming 
assurance information is a complex process, because such qualities are not givens but 
are produced through ‘the complex sociomaterial relations of commodity production, 
trade, and consumption’ (Mansfield, 2003, p. 6).  To put it another way, quality both 
links the network of production-consumption but also is a (continually changing) 
product of that networking.  Our interest here is to look at how part of that networking 
works, through thematic assurances that relate not simply to the location of production, 
but the conditions of production, especially through formalised certification about how 
food is produced.   
 
We can distinguish between two degrees of assurance: endorsement and certification.  
Endorsement is ubiquitous in promotion, allying a product with a celebrity or a charity – 
for example, the British Heart Foundation’s logo and ‘corporate partnerships’ with 
Flora pro.activ margarine.  However, this may or may not involve formal checking by 
the endorsing organisation and it is difficult for the consumer to know if it does.  
Endorsements of commercial products by health-related charities have also recently 
become the focus of debate. In 2002, the Food Commission (2002, p. 60), an 
independent UK pressure group, suggested that ‘health charities and medical 
associations are trusted by the public to give unbiased advice, free from commercial 
pressures’ and that such commercial partnerships may risk undermining this trust for 
both the charities and the companies.  By contrast, certification should guarantee that 
claims have been checked against a published standard, so it is argued to provide 
stronger assurance than endorsement, although in practice there is a gradient between 
these two, rather than a sharp demarcation.  The standard to which products are certified 
may be negative in banning undesirable practices or content, or positive in requiring 
desirable ones (Guthman, 2004) or, more usually, have a mix of the two.  Products are 
checked against the standard and, where they pass, they are licensed to use the 
assurance organisation’s logo.  Such ‘verification processes are argued to make food 
supply chains legible, traceable, and perhaps less risky’ (Guthman, 2004, p. 512) and it 
is, therefore, networking processes of verification that produce trust in a food chain and 
reconnect consumers with producers.  These verification processes can be:  
• first-party through self-regulation by a manufacturer/retailer, usually as part of its 
corporate social responsibility; 
• second-party, through checking by a trade association or similar body closely 
related to the manufacturer/retailer;  
• third-party, through checking by a body independent of the manufacturer/retailer.  
 
Although all three types involve promotion and branding, third-party certification is 
generally considered to be the strongest and least susceptible to conflicts of interest (e.g. 
Jahn et al. 2005; Hatanaka et al. 2005).  The third-party organisations that do the 
checking – the ‘certifiers’ or ‘certification bodies’ - themselves are checked by an 
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accreditation body.  For example, certifiers for the Forest Stewardship Council and 
Marine Stewardship Council schemes for sustainable timber and fish have to be 
accredited by the international headquarters of each NGO, whereas certifiers for organic 
produce in the UK have to be inspected by the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) to the 
EN45011 standard on behalf of the UK government’s environmental department, Defra.   
 
Certification is beginning to be researched in the literature, but predominantly from the 
standpoint of farming and food production (e.g. Guthman, 2004; Mutersbaugh, 2002; 
Mutersbaugh et al., 2005; Klooster, 2005; Hughes, 2000).  This is understandable, 
because of the strength of the agro-food literature, but it is an incomplete perspective, 
not least because consumers are often conceptualised very loosely, if at all, and 
assumptions are made about how they will respond to certification and other such 
information.  Like advertising and market research, such studies tend to deal with an 
‘imagined’ or ‘virtual’ consumer (Morris and Young, 2004, p. 88; Hughes, 2004), often 
cast as either ignorant or knowledgeable and invoked by retailers producers, policy 
makers and campaigners when they are developing strategies for food production and 
consumption.  As Freidberg (2003) suggests, it may be what the retailers think 
consumers think that influences what is sold and how, at least for new products, rather 
than what consumers really think (and buy), and this can be exploited politically by 
campaigners.  This parallels the public understanding of science literature, which has 
also criticised how scientific communication uses simplistic models of ‘the public’ 
(Gregory and Miller, 1998), imagining them to be either helplessly ignorant (Maranta et 
al., 2003) or excessively knowledgeable (Jasanoff, 2005, p. 254), and these model 
publics are again invoked when policy makers and campaigners are developing 
strategies for scientific education or public participation.  The problem arises where the 
virtual does not match the actual and such strategies fail.  Similarly, where the aim is to 
provide a knowledge-fix about food production, real consumers may thus fail to behave 
in the way expected from these ‘imagined’, ‘virtual’ or ‘model’ consumers, as we show 
below.   
 
Moreover, even studies which are notionally about consumption and ‘commodity 
cultures’ often fail to address how consumers think, by analysing marketing discourse 
rather than the meanings and practices involved in shopping and eating (e.g. Jackson, 
2002; Bryant and Goodman, 2004; Barnett et al., 2005).  This risks misrepresenting 
consumers, so we address this by considering not how assurance schemes and 
certification work and are promoted, but how consumers think they work.  We thus take 
a more consumer-oriented approach to food assurance, considering the ways in which 
consumers perceive, interpret and utilise different schemes and also problematising the 
simple reconnection that they offer.   
 
The other contrast with much of the literature is that this paper takes a horizontal 
approach to certification, rather than a vertical one.  Much of the agro-food and 
commodity chain research is commodity-specific and thus tracks long but narrow 
production/processing chains, whether of chickens (Watts, 2004), flowers (Hughes, 
2000), fish (Mansfield, 2003), coffee (Mutersbaugh, 2002) or organic salads (Guthman, 
2003).  Such studies provide great detail but risk issue determinism in focusing upon the 
particularities of one commodity type.  They also contrast with the consumer’s 
experience of simultaneously buying (and eating) many food products, but knowing 
each in far less detail.  The consumer experience is thus a comparative one, whereas 
cross-sector comparative cases in the literature are becoming somewhat rare.  Moreover, 
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it may well be useful for a consumer to have less detailed knowledge of an attribute 
(fairtrade, organic) that can be usefully transferred to other sectors, rather than detailed 
but nontransferable knowledge about one sector which might be only a tiny proportion 
of their weekly shopping.  Hence, the purposes and applicability of vertical studies and 
horizontal decisions are somewhat perpendicular.   
 
There are some studies that have taken a more consumer-oriented approach to assurance 
about food production, in literatures on food policy, risk and public understanding of 
science.  But they often focus on new food technologies and operations, such as genetic 
modification (GM) and irradiation, because these highlight the role of novel information 
rather than, for example, family habits or tacit knowledge in dealing with established 
foodstuffs.  For example, Poortinga and Pidgeon (2004) considered public trust in the 
regulation of GM food and how this changed during the government-sponsored ‘GM 
Nation?’ events in the UK in 2003.  Although the majority of their sample were 
ambivalent or indifferent about GM food at the beginning, their responses to these 
events were much more likely to be negative than positive.  In other words, the overall 
tendency of information and media coverage was to increase distrust (rather than to 
increase trust or have no effect).  Their sample, they argued (2004, p. 1485), ‘became 
considerably more doubtful about the risks associated with GM food and, by and large, 
more suspicious and uneasy about the long-term consequences.’  Similarly, Scholderer 
and Frewer’s (2003; also Frewer et al., 2003) survey showed that providing information 
about GM foods did not generally change pre-existing attitudes, but where it did, it was 
likely to be negative, even where the information provided was positive.  The authors 
suggested that this is because providing information caused existing attitudes to 
‘surface’.  Hayes et al. (2002) similarly gave their participants positive and negative 
information about irradiated and GM food and found that the negative information was 
much more influential, far outweighing the influence of any positive information where 
the two were combined.   
 
One problem with such studies is that they may well report atypical behaviour, because 
GM and irradiated foods are relatively novel, unlike many products (coffee, bread, fruit, 
milk) that people are used to buying.  Still, Scholderer and Frewer (2003, p. 148) note 
that ‘the very act of providing information seems to trigger the transformation of mere 
attitudes into action.  And since the attitudes were predominantly negative in the first 
place, the final result is a decrease rather than an increase in the probability that 
consumers will actually choose a GM product.’  This suggests that information 
provision is problematic and not necessarily a ‘fix’ of any kind. We shall be considering 
less dramatic cases, in looking at certification for more traditional and everyday foods, 
and we will be looking at comparative consumer judgements, rather than these very 
specific examples.  However, such studies are still useful because they demonstrate 
empirically the problem with the knowledge-fix: that people do not simply act on 
information in a linear or predictable fashion.  Drawing insights from public 
understanding of science, where knowledge is often argued to be the ‘fix’ for general 
public distrust in science and its regulation, we can thus challenge the deficit model of a 
consumption ‘knowledge-fix’ and instead try to think more carefully about how 
knowledge is regarded and used (or not) by consumers.   
 
Methodology 
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To do this, we ran six focus groups, each of 6-9 participants, in the city of York in 
northern England, in 2005.  According to the 2001 UK Census, York has around 
180,000 in the local authority area and a sociodemographic profile similar to that of 
England as a whole, but with slightly more people aged 0-4 and 16-44 and having 
higher educational qualifications, reflecting the importance of its University-related 
population.  The city is surrounded by agricultural areas and provided with a fair 
number of organic and farmgate outlets.   
 
It has been argued that the UK is now particularly disposed to consumer distrust, 
following coverage of BSE since 1996 and GM since 1998, both of which were felt 
across Europe, as well as other science- and agriculture-related controversies such as 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in 2001.  As Jasanoff (2005) has argued, different 
national cultures will affect how particular issues are confronted, given meaning and 
regulated.  However, we were surprised that the risks of BSE/CJD and FMD were rarely 
raised in our focus groups, even when participants were discussing meat quality and 
production (although a larger survey might well have generated more mentions).   
 
Our focus groups included 46 people (27 women and 19 men), aged from 23 to over 70 
and from social grades A to E.  The first four groups were chosen by a professional 
recruiter to represent a cross-section of ordinary consumers; the fifth group was of 
allotment holders who mainly grew their own fruit and vegetables and were recruited 
through an allotment association; the sixth and final group was of vegans and/or 
committed buyers of organic foods who were recruited through a local wholefood shop 
and the Soil Association, a UK NGO that promotes organic farming.  All participants 
had to fulfil two conditions: they had to be involved in shopping for food for their 
household on a regular basis and they had to be either regularly buying or at least 
interested in one of several product categories, including organic food and functional 
food, to ensure sufficient interest in discussing these topics.  Such criteria now cover a 
large proportion of the UK public: the Food Standards Agency (2006, p. 26) reported 
that 30% of shoppers surveyed in 2005 said that they regularly or occasionally bought 
organic food and the Soil Association (2006) reported that 65.4% of shoppers surveyed 
in 2005 said that they had knowingly bought organic food, with 41% doing so at least 
once a month.    
 
One reason we recruited the fifth and sixth groups differently was to see how 
individuals who had specific relationships with food differed from our cross-section of 
ordinary consumers, not least because we saw great similarity across the first four 
groups and wanted to seek out contrasts.  What surprised us was that, although 
awareness of many nutritional and environmental debates was high, particularly in the 
vegan/organic group, there was not a great deal of difference in how all six groups 
discussed confidence and trust in information, as we show below.  The National 
Consumer Council (2001, p. 7) likewise found ‘a marked consistency across all socio-
economic and age groups of key consumer concerns about food and farming,’ 
suggesting that consumer concerns, other than price, are not subject to strong cleavages 
of opinion.  Hence, in what follows, although we will occasionally draw out 
comparisons between groups, the differences were much less marked than we had 
expected, which is itself interesting.  
 
Each focus group had two facilitators and ran twice, with a week’s interval during 
which participants were given information about food assurance organisations to take 
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home for reading.  This comprised fifteen cards, each bearing a logo of an organisation 
and some text to explain their activities (see Table 1).  A range of organisations were 
chosen for horizontal comparisons from the consumers’ viewpoint, rather than a sector- 
or commodity-specific focus that risks issue determinism. All the organisations on the 
cards were genuine, but only some of them at the time did certify products in the UK.  
For those that did, we used verbatim text from existing food products on the cards.  For 
the others, we adapted text from their websites or press briefings.  Participants were 
asked to ‘imagine you’re doing your shopping and deciding what food to buy’ and to 
sort the cards to reflect the amount of confidence they had in the assurance provided.  
 
Talking about assurance schemes 
We now move on to discuss the content of the focus groups.  The first meeting of each 
group discussed food topics generally, but we began the second meeting by discussing 
the card-sorting exercise.  Our participants initially expressed a great deal of general 
support for the principle, with the majority saying that they wanted to put more on the 
side of ‘confidence’ than the sorting exercise format would let them, especially the 
women. Sally (group 1) wrote on her comment sheet when she was doing the sorting 
that ‘they all sounded worthy’, which was a frequent comment. However, a minority in 
the first five groups expressed themselves pre-disposed to be cynical about all the 
schemes from the outset, because it was easy to ‘con’ consumers: a claim to promote 
good food ‘doesn’t actually mean anything’, said Ron in the allotment group.  
 
A minority (six out of 45 participants, including five men and one woman) said that 
they did not read labels at all (and were often proud of it), because of lack of time, or 
expressly avoided doing so because this was their habit, because they distrusted 
information generally or because they did not want to encounter negative information 
and have to worry about it.  This approximates the Food Standards Agency’s (2006, p. 
49) findings that 12% of shoppers surveyed said that they did not read labels at all.  
There was a partial gender divide here: by comparison, the people who said that they 
did read labels regularly in first four groups were all women and all the vegan/organic 
group were label-conscious, but this self-recruiting group included only one man and 
eight women.  
 
So, we started out with a majority of optimism and trust in the possibilities of the 
assurance schemes, but a minority of scepticism.  What surprised us was when we 
began to discuss the schemes in detail in the second meetings, after our participants had 
read about the schemes at home, participants began to undermine the initial confidence 
that they had reported.  As with Poortinga and Pidgeon’s (2004) sample, the information 
we provided did not necessarily create the trust that was intended.  Although their 
results were quantitative, our qualitative results show a similar asymmetrical effect that 
tends towards more distrust.  However, in our case, this came not from newspaper 
coverage or government announcements about GM food, but from discussing and 
arguing with others about information and classification: the group dynamic of 
consumers was key to constructing meaning about knowledge. This process reflects a 
vernacular way of talking about food assurance and thus how attitudes are built in 
everyday life cumulatively and interactively, rather than a one-off questionnaire 
response to a piece of information.  The overall effect was, by the end of the second 
group meeting, to undermine rather than bolster their trust in the assurance schemes.  
The following sections consider the several ways that this happened.   
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Who are you?  Names as brands 
 
First, there was a lot of confusion caused by the names of assurance organisations and 
this tended to undermine consumer confidence.  As noted above, many participants 
seemed to have sorted the logo cards at home quite realistically, by reading the 
information very quickly, as they would in a shop, and often it was only when they were 
sitting in the focus group meeting with us and with the cards in front of them that they 
really began to read the text that we had given them.  When we asked Dawn why she 
had confidence in the Assured Food Standards logo, she said: 
 
Dawn  Well, I don’t know. You’ve got to rely on something, haven’t you? I 
wouldn’t say I’d buy it as against something else, but I thought, oh yes, 
that looks quite good. But I hadn’t really thought about what it meant 
and it wouldn’t necessarily influence my purchase. I would have 
assumed that it was British goods, though. (allotment group)  
 
What interests us about these arguments were how easily consumers’ confidence was 
undermined – they assumed that if they had misunderstood the name of the certifying or 
endorsing organisation, then their confidence was misplaced.  The most common 
example that participants identified (in the case of dietary advice) was that they had 
confused the World Heart Federation (WHF) with the British Heart Foundation (BHF) 
or the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) when reading the cards alone at home and then 
realised their mistake in the group.  This shook their confidence in WHF/BHF being a 
‘real’ organisation.  There was similar confusion over the General Medical Council 
(GMC, which regulates doctors and medical education in order to protect patients), and 
what participants referred to as the British Medical Council, by which we assume they 
had in mind the British Medical Association (which represents the medical profession).  
In the allotment group, Steve said that when he was reading the cards at home, he 
thought the GMC card was the BMC and ‘I didn’t think until I looked at it tonight that it 
said General Medical Council. It shows that we don’t read labels very well.’  
 
It also shows that it is the name which is recognised and the organisations themselves 
were therefore treated as we treat brands on other products, in a quick test of familiarity.  
The organisation, the brand, the logo, stands in for a multitude of other practices and 
knowledges – it is a shorthand learned through the prevalent capitalist logic of 
shopping, even where a scheme sets out to challenge that logic, such as with Fairtrade 
(Goodman, 2004).  Moreover, many participants found their earlier confidence in the 
logos disrupted by focus group discussions or by simply re-reading the cards at more 
leisure while in the second group meeting.  Perhaps because our instructions had been to 
‘imagine’ they were shopping, several participants asked us if the logos they had been 
given were ‘real’/‘genuine’ or ‘made up’/’bogus’ (imagined) – that is, whether the 
organisations were real, not whether the assurance claims were real.  Mark pushed us 
to tell him:  
 
Mark I did wonder when I was doing it, are they actually real these or are they 
things that you’ve created for the research?...  I thought they were just 
creations, to be honest.  (group 1) 
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In the allotment and the vegan/organic groups, we were similarly (but less insistently) 
pushed to say which organisations we had invented.  In all three cases, when we 
explained that all the organisations existed, everyone was surprised that none of the 
logos or names had been invented by us.  In particular, several participants said that the 
following were ‘made up’: Assured Food Standards (‘Red Tractor’ symbol) 3, especially 
in the vegan/organic group, the General Medical Council and the World Heart 
Federation.   
 
Chantal  I did kind of wonder if some of those logos were just completely made 
up and what kind of credibility they’d have – if they are organisations 
that were just set up, yeah, like you just sort of made one up, just like 
you said. If you brought out a new product, you’d make up some kind of 
‘guaranteed by Chantal’ – what does that mean?!  You get a lot of those, 
don’t you? You get guaranteed by some random thing that you’ve never 
heard of. You just think people are [we think she wanted to say 
‘gullible’] - I mean they rely on people liking the word ‘guaranteed’ or, 
don’t they? You do get that on a lot of stuff, don’t you? And it doesn’t 
actually mean anything. (vegan/organic group) 
 
It was also interesting that although participants had a week between focus group 
meetings to read and sort the cards, none of them checked the logos for ‘reality’ on the 
internet or elsewhere.  When asked, one person said they thought this would be 
‘cheating’, if they were following our instructions to ‘imagine you’re doing your 
shopping’, because they did not shop accompanied by a live internet connection.  In the 
end, a lot of participants said they based their judgement about the schemes on 
‘familiarity’, i.e. whether they recognised (or thought they recognised, pace the 
problems with names above) the organisations, because, as Brenda in the vegan/organic 
group said, ‘How could you trust ones you’d never heard of before?’   
 
The text that we had provided to explain the schemes and describe their monitoring and 
standard-setting activities prompted little discussion compared with the organisations’ 
logos and names.  As Laura (in group 1) summarised: ‘I would say the name stood out 
and swayed me before I’d even read [the text].’  So, participants’ judgements often 
boiled down to brand recognition, which was highly variable and unstable for different 
participants.  As we had expected, the vegan/organic group particularly identified the 
Soil Association logo as so familiar that they did not bother reading the text we had 
provided to explain it.  As Chantal said, ‘I don’t think I read through that one because I 
know it so well. I only read ones that I wasn’t familiar with.’  Like a brand, the logo 
itself functioned to assure a specific product quality and different consumer-participants 
had different brand awareness.  This ironically suggests that familiarity and branding for 
assurance schemes in the interests of mainstream appeal can re-fetishize the product, or 
at least re-work the fetish (Goodman, 2004), so that a logo that seeks to provide 
knowledge and stimulate consumer reconnection itself becomes something not to think 
about.   
 
What are you?  The problem of independence 
 
As well as name recognition, we also talked to our participants about how certification 
schemes might operate in practice, but this proved difficult.  First, our participants 
tended to assume that all food was closely regulated in Britain and did not really see 
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how voluntary schemes could fit into this process or go beyond this baseline.  They 
expressed a lot of uncertainty and confusion about whether the government is (or should 
be) the body responsible for checking the claims on products.  This was not helped by 
the way that several assurance schemes describe their standards as including legal 
compliance, because this seemed tautological to many participants: legal compliance 
should apply to every food product that they can buy, not just to ones differentiated by a 
special logo, whether they expected the regulators to be government departments like 
Defra or MAFF (as was) or local regulators like Trading Standards officers.  As Sarah 
in group 1 noted of the Tesco organic claim, ‘of course they adhere to the strict EU 
regulations, because they all do. They have to!’  This was particularly noted for the 
Assured Food Standards scheme: 
 
Chantal What does it mean? Doesn’t all food get checked through the whole 
process?  It must do.  (vegan/organic group) 
 
Julie You’d have thought the Ministry of Agriculture would be checking on 
farms, surely. (group 1) 
 
This is precisely why UK consumer groups like the National Consumer Council (2001, 
p. 24) have criticised such farm assurance schemes for ‘failing to offer any more than 
the legal minimum’ by way of production standards (also Morris and Young 2004, p. 
91).  In this sense, even the anti-government participants said that the baseline of safety 
and animal welfare should be the business of government, because only government 
was powerful enough to check fully and impose meaningful sanctions on transgressors.   
 
But many certification schemes argue that independence and transparency are essential 
to their credibility, particularly when ensured through third-party certification, and 
hence give them power to influence demand and to promote sustainable production.  
For example, independence is argued to ensure rigour for the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC 2006), the Assured Food Standards ‘Red Tractor’ scheme (Policy 
Commission on the Future of Farming and Food, 2002) and certification in general 
(Jahn et al. 2005) and also to distinguish it from mere corporate endorsement or 
sponsorship.  But our participants did not all share this priority and varied greatly as to 
how they judged independence and whether it influenced their trust.  For some, 
independence meant that the assurance organisation retained autonomy to criticise 
powerful actors, to be outside their control, so it was a very positive attribute:  
 
Philip They’ve almost got to be independent because it’s all about money, isn’t 
it? Who funds these people?  People, probably the big farming 
community and the retailers are probably the ones who’re funding the 
government, MAFF, or whatever, so they want the Ministry for Farming 
and Fisheries or whatever the results to suit the retailers. You almost 
want somebody totally independent who’s not linked in to the 
government or anything, that isn’t under pressure and just says it the way 
it is rather than saying ‘you can’t say that because Tesco is a big, they 
give us £10 million, £100 million into the government funds so we can’t 
say that they do bad things.’ You want them to be totally independent. 
Facilitator Is there anyone like that? 
Philip  Probably Greenpeace or something like that are the only ones. (group 4) 
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The reference to Greenpeace was also made by Paul in group 3, but neither references 
were picked up for more discussion by others (nor was the Friends of the Earth ‘GM-
free’ logo).  Both do value an NGO that has made independence a key attribute and 
indeed this is one reason why Greenpeace refused to become a member of the Marine 
Stewardship Council’s scheme to certify sustainably sourced fish, because of the 
possible compromise required with industrial interests (MSC, personal communication 
2005).  But such views were unusual because participants were more interested in 
whether certification schemes were powerful enough to inspect, sanction and thus 
change things.   
 
Cathy  The thing that put me off that one [Assured Food Standards ‘Red 
Tractor’], it said that ‘food is produced to independently inspected 
standards’. Who’s inspecting it? Independently? Who’s this independent 
person or persons? 
Facilitator  Who would you want it to be? 
Alison  It would need to be somebody who had some clout, somebody who could 
take them to court or something like that. (group 3) 
 
The question of independence was seen differently amongst our participants.  
Government backing of assurance schemes was seen as good by some, because it 
offered the only possibility of strong regulation, but bad by others, because they took a 
neo-liberal line against regulation or ‘intervention’ in general.  This emphasised power 
but had the disadvantage of lack of independence.   
 
Steve   I think there should be some government body that checks on these, 
checks on the statements, checks on the company. (allotment group) 
 
The other irony here is common to many environmental problems: people want 
government to act, because they are the only ones powerful enough to regulate 
production, but at the same time many participants say elsewhere that government (as 
‘the nanny state’) is too intervening and untrustworthy.  Again, the tension between 
independence and power is problematic: only government has the ultimate power, but it 
is not trusted as much as the not-for-profits and charities.   
 
Philip We fund the government, don’t we, with our taxes? And the 
government’s supposed to be looking after us.  (group 4) 
 
By comparison, commercial assurance schemes or forms of endorsement were generally 
seen as bad in principle because they lacked independence and were in the interests of 
the company, not of the consumer.  The Tesco organic logo generated dichotomous 
views from Tesco shoppers and non-shoppers, who contrasted the power of Tesco to 
check (and thus control) its suppliers with its lack of motive to spend money protecting 
consumers.   
 
Andrew  I think places like Tesco’s, they do go round, they have their own 
auditors that go round these farms and things like that and check. And 
they go round the manufacturers – meat manufacturers and places like 
that – they do go round regularly to check regularly that they’re 
producing their products to their standards, to their specifications. (group 
3) 
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Harriet  I’m not sure about that, but would you trust Tesco Organic because you 
know Tesco is behind it? 
Chantal  Yeah, I wondered about that. 
Harriet  You know, something that has a business behind it is [less trusted] 
Tim I found that one of the most interesting, because I know from experience 
that certainly government organisations don’t have the resources to check 
everything, so things that have government labels are checked 
periodically but not so rigorously, and I would think that the same is true 
for non-government organisations, so the only people that really do have 
the resources to inspect things carefully would be commercial 
organisations like Tesco’s, but, of course, they’ve got a commercial 
reason why they’re doing those inspections, so whether you’d believe 
that. (vegan/organic group) 
 
Such commercial distrust is ironic when food shopping in the UK is dominated by big 
retailers like Tesco, which had the largest single share of the food market, selling 30.5% 
of UK groceries in 2005 (BBC, 2005).  ‘When people do go food shopping, they almost 
always go to a supermarket’ (Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food, 
2002, p. 16), with 92% of consumers surveyed by the FSA saying that they buy most of 
their household food from supermarkets (FSA 2006).  Most organic food in the UK is 
also sold through multiples like supermarkets, with about 90% of shoppers surveyed by 
the Soil Association (2006) saying that they bought their organic food in supermarkets.  
In 2005 Tesco had the largest single market share of the UK organic food market and 
organic produce sold in its York store was independently certified by third parties like 
the Soil Association and Organic Farmers and Growers.  Despite this, our participants 
retained the right to be sceptical about Tesco’s lack of independence:  
 
Paul Tesco are just pushing their own stuff. It’s just to get the sales up for 
them. If it had said Asda’s or Sainsbury’s organic, all they’re doing is 
trying to push their own food. (group 3) 
 
Tom  I like thinking that dolphins are being protected [by the Marine 
Conservation Society], whereas I know that Tesco’s couldn’t give a 
damn one way or another. (allotment group) 
 
By comparison, not-for-profit NGOs and charitable organisations were seen as 
independent and thus good.  Gabrielle was a member of the Soil Association and said of 
them (in the vegan/organic group): ‘They’re the real thing…. They’re totally 
independent and totally ethical and high standards.’  Fairtrade was another example 
mentioned in two groups as a positive and trustworthy independent organisation.  As 
another example, the Marine Stewardship Council certifies fisheries that are sustainably 
managed, in the interests of long term stocks, but it is noticeable that it is not the 
certification process (whether third-party or otherwise) that generates our participants’ 
support, but the nature of the organisation itself.  
 
Alison I think ‘non-profit organisation’ leaps out at you [from the text on the 
card], because they’re doing it for the good of it then, aren’t they? Not 
for any monetary… 
Paul Not doing it to make any profit or anything like that. (group 3) 
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This echoes other studies and surveys that show higher trust in NGOs than in other sorts 
of organisation (e.g. Worcester 2001).  In the Food Standards Agency’s (2006, p. 66) 
survey, consumer groups came top for the ‘reliability’ of their information, whereas the 
bottom three were, in descending order, government, local councils and supermarkets 
(although the gaps between the top and bottom scores were fairly small).  A MORI poll 
in the UK in 2000 reported 78% of respondents had a great deal or a fair amount of 
confidence in scientists working for environmental groups, but only 48% in industrial 
scientists.  Frewer et al. (1996) also found NGOs (both consumer and environmental) 
more trusted than government and industry in the case of providing information about 
food risks in the UK and Frewer et al. (2003) found that a (fictional) consumer NGO 
was consistently rated by their respondents as more expert and more trustworthy than 
governmental and industrial sources.  Similarly, Hayes et al. (2002) found that 
information about irradiated and GM food attributed to what they termed ‘advocacy 
groups’ was the most influential, showing that trust is produced not merely by 
information, but by its source (a point they seem to have missed).  In other words, the 
messenger, not necessarily the message, matters.  
 
However, this inclination towards trust is unstable: if the ideal is independence, there 
remains doubt that this is possible in practice.  Sceptics in our groups suspected even 
‘independent’ organisations were funded by government and/or commercial monies.  
Because the Organic Farmers and Growers card did not state that the organisation is 
not-for-profit, Chantal in the vegan/organic group trusted it less than the Soil 
Association, because ‘I’m thinking it could just be a cartel of farmers that have decided 
to stick that on their products.’  Similarly, Sarah (in group 1) thought the Assured Food 
Standards logo ‘meant sweet FA!  So you know, do you know what I mean? It’s an 
independent body that’s looking after its own.’   
 
Moreover, people often did not classify organisations very clearly, so that independence 
was muddled or confused, raising many questions in discussion, such as: is the Food 
Standards Agency the government?  (Yes.)4  Does the World Heart Federation get 
government money?  (Not strictly, it is an umbrella group for national foundations, 
which may access government grants but are not directly paid for by government.)  
Does the Soil Association do certification for Tesco?  (Yes – but even the people 
recruited via the Soil Association were confused about this.)  The groups struggled 
together to try to define the characteristics of organisations, especially the extent of their 
affiliation to government.  Mark and Matthew tried various ways to define the 
independence and power of assurance organisations, producing a confusing typology 
where ‘regulatory’ character was not necessarily connected to government but was 
about having power and muscle and being able to enforce sanctions or other 
consequences for transgressors, like a certification police force.  Moreover, they 
ascribed regulatory qualities to a mixed bag of organisations, including both NGOs and 
quangos or nondepartmental public bodies: 5  
 
Mark I tended to look at them as to whether they were regulatory bodies or 
voluntary organisations, on the basis that if they were regulatory, their 
standards were more likely to be enforced than the ones where ‘we’ll all 
just get together and this is a good idea’ type arrangement.  
Facilitator And which ones did you classify as regulatory? 
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Mark  World Heart Federation, Soil Association, GMC, National Consumer 
Council, Fairtrade, which is a voluntary body, Food Standards Agency.6  
Matthew You see, I did actually put the RSPCA quite high up because I know that 
they do prosecute.  They will take you to court. They’re one of these 
[organisations] that do actually have teeth. 
Facilitator Is that what you were meaning by regulatory?  Having teeth? 
Mark Yes, something that can enforce a standard, and people have to adhere to 
a standard if they’re going to operate in a particular market. (group 1) 
 
Our participants thus had difficulty evaluating the intermediaries providing the 
knowledge-fix, regardless of the information on the cards.  The character of ‘those who 
know’ was highly contingent and dependent upon a range of validation mechanisms – 
so trust had to be earned and maintained, it was not a given.   
 
This reflects current debates about how knowledge is produced in social contexts.  
Many ethical trading and environmental assurance schemes depend upon a 
heterogeneous mix of commercial, non-governmental and governmental entities to build 
credibility, particularly in the face of a more sceptical and potentially distrusting public 
(Irwin and Michael 2003, p. 147).  Unfortunately, this can make judgements about trust 
even more complicated for consumers. In the fourth group, we tried to clarify the 
vernacular classification of ‘independence’, but the discussion very soon became quite 
confused and disparate.  In the vegan/organic group, Gabrielle argued that government 
is run by big business, so differentiating those two is also pointless, because ‘a lot of 
government decisions about what they’ll allow in food are very, very influenced by 
marketing processes and big corporations [lobbying].’  Even in cases of specialised 
knowledge, scepticism often won out.  The allotment group all recognised the Soil 
Association’s logo, but still found it difficult to decide its status:  
 
Dawn  Who’s the Soil Association run by? [Do we know] That they’re not a 
government organisation? 
Steve  It’s an independent body, but I don’t know. 
Ron  They’re a body set up to legitimise people… [unclear] to organic food, 
basically. Most organisations are based either governmentally or 
financially. And I think the Soil Association originally – in fact, still is – 
a financial organisation, because if you’ve got the Soil Association logo, 
it means your soil’s clean and you can charge more. 
Facilitator When you say ‘financial’ do you mean profit-making? 
Ron  Oh yeah.  Money. Money, money, money.  Only one thing. 
Steve  Is it to make profit, though, or is it done to break even and provide that 
service? 
Ron  I think the Soil Association itself is a non-profit-making organisation, but 
the farmers within the organisation are profit-making. 
Steve  And one assumes they pay a fee to the organisation to keep it going – the 
growers. (allotment group) 
 
So, some participants subscribed to the notion of independent (third-party) certification 
being more trustworthy, just as the literature does (e.g. Jahn et al., 2005; Hatanaka et al., 
2005).  However, this was not widespread and classifying individual schemes as 
independent was also difficult for many.   
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What do assurance schemes do?    
 
Moreover, when we did manage to get our participants to tell us what they thought was 
involved in voluntary certification schemes, they did not talk about principles or the 
higher standards (beyond legal compliance) but about possible practices, especially the 
strict inspection regime that they imagined.  To do this, they applied models transferred 
from regulatory modes of inspection and enforcement, such as for the Assured Food 
Standards scheme:  
 
Matthew I get the feeling that there’s someone checking the food. If it’s chickens 
they’re checking the welfare of the chickens. If it’s a slaughterhouse, 
they’re checking how it’s slaughtered, checks whether it’s healthy meat, 
or not healthy meat, it’s given the stamp to then go on to be diced and 
sliced and packed. I’m assuming that’s what it covers. 
Julie  I think it would include the vets – looking at the animals while they’re 
still on the farm, because they’re independent…   
Matthew  I would imagine that the carcasses for beef, pork, are inspected visually 
and possibly one in however many are taken as samples off to be tested 
for bacterial content. 
Sarah No, I don’t think they’d do that. Not the bacteria bit but the first bit, yeah. 
Julie  Now doesn’t every animal have its own little passport that you can’t 
move animals even from farm to farm without… 
Sally It’s got to have got tighter with mad cow disease, hasn’t it? But I couldn’t 
tell you how it’s got tighter, or what they do. (group 1) 
 
This is one of very few mentions of mad cow disease/BSE that we heard in over twenty 
hours of discussion and even this one was not followed up.  This seems to contradict the 
frequent argument that the legacy of BSE in the mid-1990s is important in the UK 
because it has changed public debate and expectations and has engendered distrust.  For 
our groups, BSE had receded into the background, rather than disappeared altogether as 
a concern (also FSA 2006).  However, the legacy of the 2001 FMD outbreak also 
cropped up occasionally, not least because it again gave consumers models for 
imagining certification processes and especially traceability:  
 
Julie  You can check from the supermarket, can’t you, you can trace it back to 
where the animal’s come from and when it was born and when it was… 
Sarah  Because they did with the first Foot and Mouth, didn’t they? They knew 
where it had come from. 
Mark  That’s only to trace it back in case they’re diseased. It’s nothing to do 
with how old it is, or they slaughtered it three months ago (group 1) 
 
Indeed, this legacy of the difficulties of monitoring also led our participants to doubt 
how rigorous certification processes of checking could really be, for example, in the 
case of organic certification:  
 
Rob  I think you have to look at the Foot and Mouth [case].  They didn’t have 
enough vets and people to get to all the farms to stop the Foot and Mouth 
spreading without seeing them going to all these places to verify that 
everything’s right. They had a small crisis which turned into a massive 
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crisis obviously. But they couldn’t handle that, so how can they handle 
this!  (group 4) 
 
Particularly when imagining certification processes in international supply chains and 
small (non-governmental and charitable) groups, people foresaw problems.  Not-for-
profit organisations, even where well-meaning, were assumed not to have the size or the 
capacity for inspection, because there is too much to check, especially in international 
supply chains.  This sees NGOs as independent but less powerful agents of assurance:  
 
Robert  [talking about the Assured Food Standards ‘Red Tractor’ scheme] I can’t 
see them being there right from the start from the farm til it goes in the 
pack – it would take forever. And to monitor every farm and what’s 
produced and things, I just can’t quite see that to be honest. I just think it 
would be a lot of time, money and effort, and I don’t think it’s viable 
really. 
Debbie  It’s not realistic to think that we can see everything, is it? (group 2) 
 
Simon [talking about the Marine Stewardship Council scheme] I can’t see how 
they could do that.  How can you tell what boat’s gone out?  I don’t know 
how it works. They can’t tell me they don’t have x, so they throw it back. 
I mean it’s dead anyway, so why throw it away? But how do they know 
they haven’t got loads of fish underneath in the freezer. They’re just 
getting there what they’ve been quoted.  There could be some in the 
bottom that they can sell privately or something like that.  That they’ve 
over fished.  I can’t see how they could count every fish that comes on 
shore in Europe accurately.  I can’t see how it works. (group 2) 
 
As well as inspection, imports were seen as problematic, because, as noted above, 
although participants assumed that British regulations applied to all food, they were 
much more distrustful and uncertain about other countries’ regulations, because of 
geographical distance but also variability in regimes.  In the vegan/organic group, 
Gabrielle said, of organic food, ‘a lot of it’s sourced from abroad, where it’s hard to 
check,’ not least because of the large volumes that have to be processed.  
 
Lorna Can you imagine how many boxes of [organic] bananas are imported a 
day? 
Peter They’re not going to check them all!7 (group 2) 
 
Moreover, British standards were often assumed to be stricter and more enforced 
through regulation than those overseas.  Several participants were both nationalistic in 
wanting British produce because of good regulation (or xenophobia, depending on their 
mood), but also anti-regulation because of ‘nanny state’ arguments, noted above.  This 
contradiction was highlighted when they talked about the Assured Food Standards ‘Red 
Tractor’ scheme, which they interpreted as quasi-regulatory.  Whilst supported by 
government and quasi-non-governmental agencies, such as the Food Standards Agency 
(2006) and the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food (2002), this 
scheme is a voluntary one run by the farming industry (Assured Food Standards 2006).  
Moreover, the logo was changed in 2005 to incorporate part of the British flag (Assured 
Food Standards 2006), and this visible clue prompted several participants to express 
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greater confidence in this scheme,8 particularly older participants like Mabel, who were 
very distrustful of other European countries’ regulations:   
 
Mabel  I trust British things more than foreign things – especially for food.  You 
hope you can trust them anyway, put it like that.  More locally grown.  I 
know you buy your chickens all from Taiwan or wherever, but British is 
best – I think so anyway… You’d trust that they [i.e. British foods] 
would be healthier for you, that they were being better looked after 
(group 4) 
 
A lot of the arguments boiled down to support of the principle of certification but 
scepticism about the practices and powers of the certification bodies to carry it out with 
sufficient rigour across complex supply chains that included big companies:    
 
Steve  I think the biggest [problem] is how do they check everything. Like Tom 
said earlier on.  How many inspectors do these people have?  How do 
they check everything?  I think the checks must be rudimentary.  
(allotment group) 
 
A minority of participants were distrustful of certification throughout the discussion, 
considering it readily open to abuse or fraud. Referring to the ‘dolphin-friendly’ Marine 
Conservation Society logo, three people in the fourth group argued that such claims 
were not trustworthy because the dolphins killed by the fishing crews would be hidden 
from the inspectors, i.e. the well-meaning but gullible NGOs would be fooled by the 
dodgy practices of commercial interests: the claims were merely paper ones, not real 
ones.  They also questioned the independence of the inspections process for organic 
produce, projecting their own lack of agency in being unable to verify it for themselves 
and often seeking to persuade other participants in their groups to share their scepticism:  
 
Rob  If you want to believe it, you can believe but what’s to say that Farmer 
Brown’s not best mates with the bloke from the Soil Association. Says 
‘I’ve not had much money this year – we’ll just push these through.’ 
We’ll never know. A cynical look at it but they’ll put a rubber stamp on 
it but you’ll never know.  (group 4) 
 
Given all this scepticism, many of our participants argued that they had no option but to 
trust the information provided to them, because of their own lack of knowledge and 
agency in the face of the massive (and remote) food industry.  This suggests that they 
did not feel empowered by the assurance schemes, as their organisers might hope.   
 
Mabel We take them at face value, because that’s what we read and that’s what 
we’re told and so we take it as true, so it should be true, because 
otherwise it’s… 
Facilitator How about when you go to the supermarket to buy beef or something 
like that and you go to the shelf and it’s all packaged up.  How do you 
know that’s organic? 
Sarah Because it says so. You take their word for it! (group 4) 
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Indeed, some of the confidence that participants like Steve had expressed at the 
beginning of the meeting ebbed away by the end, especially once it came under assault 
from the more sceptical members of the group, such as Ron in this case.   
 
Steve  We don’t know. We believe, but we don’t know absolutely factually that 
it is what it says, does what it says. (allotment group) 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have taken a more consumer-oriented approach to assurance schemes in order to 
look at how they are given meaning, by comparison with the more common producer-
oriented focus upon direct sales and shorter supply chains.  We have some rather 
downbeat conclusions.  Our results problematise the knowledge-fix urged by the 
academic and campaigning literature, because our participants do not necessarily 
respond positively to assurance information and schemes and often it is not clear to 
them what is being assured about food production or how.  Although people initially 
expressed lots of confidence in the food assurance examples, this confidence was 
destabilised by subsequent discussion and the difficulties of articulating reasons for 
such confidence, as might happen in ‘real world’ conversations about shopping. Hence, 
the effect of assurance schemes and information can be counter-intuitive, in that more 
information and discussion caused our participants to re-consider, often negatively, food 
production and regulation processes, which tended to increase scepticism rather than 
reduce it.  We also felt that participants were worried about being gullible and suggest 
that a history of well-publicised problems in UK food and agricultural regulation have 
perhaps made consumers feel that there is safety in scepticism. 
 
This obviously is not good news for assurance schemes, suggesting that they do not 
necessarily re-assure and may even increase scepticism if people ponder the difficulties 
of creating and maintaining an effective inspections regime.  However, if they are also 
prompting increased awareness and discussion, and even enthusiastic debate, as our 
groups showed, we could see that as positive in at least addressing the ‘distancing’ and 
thus consumers’ habit of ignoring food production, given the many other demands on 
their everyday lives.  Moreover, if Freidberg (2003) is correct, and retailers are swayed 
by what they think consumers think, rather than by what consumers actually think, then 
consumer scepticism does not matter as much in practical terms, so long as the 
campaigns for consumer information and assurance continue to have political clout.  
 
Moreover, participants found it difficult to work out what certification involved and the 
status of the organisations that were providing assurance.  Although our two ‘specialist’ 
groups were more knowledgeable about food production, especially about growing and 
sourcing organic fruit and vegetables, their views about assurance and certification were 
very similar to those of the other groups.  Our participants built vernacular typologies 
and comparative judgements to give assurance schemes meaning, but these did not 
necessarily identify or prioritise third-party certification as more independent than other 
forms of certification or endorsement, as the literature might suggest (see above), not 
least because of the practical difficulties of monitoring complex supply chains.  The 
details of certification chains, however complex, are thus wrapped up in general 
recognition (or not) of logos and organisations, again stressing the horizontality of the 
consumer experience and its necessary lack of depth when shopping is done at speed.   
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So, we need to move beyond a simple argument that providing information will change 
consumption or even be readily understandable.  Labelling and other forms of assurance 
are assessed by consumers in the context of myriad historical and contemporaneous 
factors connected with food, science, government and business, not in splendid 
isolation.  As we noted above, the literature’s detailed studies of individual commodities 
such as chicken, salad leaves and fish (Watts 2004; Guthman 2003; Mansfield 2003) 
contrast with the consumer experience of encountering many commodities in the same 
space, vying for attention on the shelves of a shop.  Consumers must weigh the products 
and the information about them alongside each other, when buying perhaps thirty 
different products in as many minutes, so that consumer knowledges, therefore, are not 
highly detailed and commodity-specific, but broad and comparative.  We have to bear 
this in mind when we consider that increasing sales figures suggest that, for organic and 
fairtrade food at least, scepticism is not necessarily affecting behaviour: people continue 
to buy.  This makes sense, however, when we consider that these sectors remain very 
small compared to others - and the other sectors may promote far more scepticism as 
being even less well managed and assured.  Again, in a world of consumer choices, 
judgements about food are highly comparative and complex.   
 
Our point is that the reconnection agenda imagines consumers too simplistically, seeing 
them as disconnected (and therefore ignorant) and ready to respond positively to 
information about the supply chain.  People buy food all the time and know a lot about 
it and, when prompted as they were in our groups, they can imagine even more.  Yet 
they often do not change their behaviour simply in response to information from 
assurance schemes, even where they seem to agree with their principles.  To put it 
simply, we do not always do what we say we do or what we think we should do - the 
history of smoking shows us this very obviously.  As researchers, therefore, we need to 
examine further how knowledge about food is produced and consumed in different 
contexts and how ongoing debates and activities can both give meaning to food 
assurance but also destabilise and undermine it.  
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Table 1.  Assurance organisations used as prompts in the focus groups.  
 
Name  
 
Type of 
organisation 
Did they assure/endorse products in 
UK in 2005 and for what theme?  
Soil Association NGO (UK) Yes, certification body for organic food 
Organic Farmers & Growers NGO (UK) Yes, certification body for organic food 
Tesco Organic Commercial 
retailer 
No, but their organic products are 
certified by other bodies 
Conservation Grade (run by 
the Jordans cereal company) 
Commercial 
manufacturers 
Yes, for environmental and wildlife 
impacts 
Friends of the Earth – GM-
free campaign 
NGO 
(international) 
No, off-product campaign 
RSPCA - Freedom Food NGO (UK) Yes, for animal welfare 
Assured Food Standards  NGO (UK) Yes, for animal welfare, environment, 
safety, legislative compliance, see  
Marine Stewardship Council NGO 
(international) 
Yes, for sustainable fisheries, see 
Marine Conservation Society NGO (UK)  No, off-product guidance 
Fairtrade Foundation NGO (UK)  Yes, for human welfare and economic 
impacts 
Food Standards Agency  Quango (UK) No, monitors food safety and labelling 
National Consumer Council Quango (UK) No, advises government on consumer 
issues 
CORE NGO (UK) No, supports those suffering from 
digestive disorders 
World Heart Federation  NGO 
(international) 
Yes, endorses for human health impacts 
General Medical Council Quango (UK) No, regulates medical profession 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 We have capitalised this term when we refer to the specific assurance scheme run by 
the Fairtrade Foundation, but not capitalised it when we refer to the general principle of 
guaranteeing producers a fair and stable price (see Fairtrade Foundation,  
http://www.fairtradeatwork.org.uk/ , accessed 10 May 2007).   
2 As one of our referees noted, we could refer to these as (1) a spatial fix and (2) a 
knowledge fix to the perceived problem of disconnection.  However, they are more 
similar than that dichotomy implies, because farm shops and farm markets are still 
remote from the fields and factories which produce their foods.  Knowledge is still 
important, although consumers rely more on face-to-face mediation and interpersonal 
knowledge, than the more detached, depersonalised knowledge offered by assurance 
schemes.  We deal with some of these interesting issues in another paper, due to lack of 
space in this one.  
3 In contrast, the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food (2002) reported 
that the Red Tractor had 33% recognition amongst UK shoppers and wanted it to 
become the ‘baseline standard’, whilst being very lukewarm about other schemes with 
higher standards.  
4 As one referee noted, this might give the impression that we, as researchers, were more 
knowledgeable than consumers.  We should point out that we often could not answer 
questions put to us in the groups, but we did what any consumer could do and looked on 
the internet or phoned someone in a key organisation to find out the answers after the 
group - what our participants had referred to as ‘cheating’.   On other matters, such as 
diet or growing vegetables, our participants were more knowledgeable than we were; 
indeed, one participant who worked in a government agency was able to answer some 
questions raised by other participants, thus illustrating the considerable knowledge 
gradients between different consumers.   
5 A quango is a quasi-nongovernmental organisation, which looks separate from 
government, in that it is is not directly part of a government department or ministry, but 
has connections to government, usually because government appoints its senior staff 
and gives it statutory duties and responsibilities, often to do with monitoring and 
policing regulation.  An example in the UK is the Environment Agency for England and 
Wales.  The degree of independence from government is clearly both important but also 
difficult for our participants to decide.  
6 The Soil Association is an environmental campaigning group; the GMC is a charity 
but with statutory functions under UK legislation; the National Consumer Council is a 
quango primarily funded and appointed by government and the Food Standards Agency 
is a quango set up by government in 2000 and reporting to health ministers.  So, out of 
Mark’s list, only the FSA has any powers that could accurately be called ‘regulatory’.  
7 In practice, the UK government’s environmental ministry, Defra, regulates and spot-
checks all imports of organic produce against national and European criteria (Defra, 
personal communication, 2006), so this is a regulatory process.  
8 This problem of nationalism and the difference between ‘British’ and ‘local’ agendas 
is rarely noted in the literature on quality and authenticity in food assurance, which is 
unfortunate because there is a big geographical and sociopolitical difference in 
emphasis.  With respect to AFS, where the produce originates in Britain, part of the 
British flag can be added to the ‘Red Tractor’ logo, but it is not an essential condition of 
the scheme (Food Standards Agency 2006).  
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